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An influx of investment money into commodity futures can distort the broader economic picture, 
but it can also help commodity producers hedge price risks 
From 2000 to 2005, corn futures on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) fluctuated between 
US$2 to US$3 per bushel (for each lot of 5000 bushels), and only occasionally dipping below or 
rising above that range. At the end of 2006, it climbed towards US$4, and was on its way to 
setting what was then an all-time high for nearby contracts i.e. contracts with the closest 
settlement date, at US$7.625 on June 27, 2008 for the July 2008 contract. 
Barely more than a year later in August 2009, corn futures were trading at barely over US$3. 
This boom-and-bust cycle happened to almost every other commodity, which led to hedge fund 
manager Michael Masters’s testimony before the Commodities Futures Trading Commission that 
institutional investment capital flowing into the commodity futures market had caused a bubble to 
form. 
“Whether there was a bubble is a tricky question,” says Wei Xiong, Professor of Economics at 
Princeton University. “To argue that there is a bubble, you need to prove that prices are too high 
relative to fundamentals. However, the fundamental value of a commodity is very hard to define 
due to the difficulty of measuring supply and demand. In the end, this debate ended up going 
nowhere.” 
He added, “Financial capital affects markets in more subtle and nuanced ways. When we think of 
financial market trading, there are many important basic issues. One of them is information 
discovery.” 
The long and short of it  
Xiong, who was the speaker at the recent Wilmar International Professorship in Commodities 
Business public lecture, “The Financialization of Commodity Markets”, describes how commodity 
prices are often barometers for gauging the strength of the global economy. In his research, 
Xiong found that when commodity futures in the U.S. go up, stock prices in East Asian countries 
that are nett importers of commodities – China, South Korea, Japan etc. – counterintuitively go 
up. 
“Despite the price of commodities rising and these countries having to pay more for them, their 
stock prices go up as well; it’s curious,” Xiong muses. “In effect, these countries view the rising 
commodity futures prices as a signal of economic strength in the global economy. In this light, if 
the capital inflow affects the commodity prices, an immediate consequence is that it will affect the 
information system which is very important for the economy as well as the commodity market 
itself. 
“When people think the global economy is strong, the demand for commodities will be higher 
despite the cost being higher. It would be simple-minded to think that as commodity prices go up, 
demand should go down. That’s why I argue that the financialisation can affect the commodity 
markets through this information channel.” 
Despite this seemingly negative characteristic, Xiong also pointed out the necessity of and 
motivation for creating commodity futures i.e. farmers hedging to protect the value of their crops. 
“The large inflow of investment capital helps hedging because the investment capital typically 
comes to the ‘long’ side (buying the underlying asset in the future), which is the opposite of 
where the farmers do their hedging. In that sense, they meet each other’s needs.” 
"If hedgers just want to hedge the price risks of those crops in the field, their 
position doesn’t have to change that much (but) farmers and producers trade 
a lot more than the anticipated output fluctuations." 
To illustrate this relationship, imagine a farmer in April who expects in July a harvest of one lot of 
corn i.e. 5,000 bushels. The cash price of a bushel of corn in April is US$4.00, so the farmer 
hedges by selling one lot of September futures contract at US$4.50 (the farmer is selling, so he 
is on the “short” side, and therefore he is “short hedging”). 
When he harvests the corn in July, prices had dropped to $3.75. He buys a futures contract for 
one bushel of corn for September delivery i.e. closing his futures position, at $4.20. The 30-cent 
gain (US$4.50 – US$4.20) from short hedging more than offset the 25-cent fall in corn prices 
from April to July; he makes 5 cents more per bushel, which translates to US$250 per lot. 
Traders and hedgers: Sharing risk  
Without investment capital taking up long positions, the farmer would have lost money. However, 
farmers are not just hedging against possible price falls. Xiong says farmers are also trading and 
even speculating. 
“If you look at the trading of the hedgers, their needs are easy to measure. The output of a 
certain crop – wheat or soybeans, for example – has a fixed season. The output itself doesn’t 
fluctuate that much – once the seeds are planted in the field, the output is relatively stable. 
“If hedgers just want to hedge the price risks of those crops in the field, their position doesn’t 
have to change that much. On the other hand, if you look at the data, you’ll realise that these 
farmers and producers trade a lot more than the anticipated output fluctuations.” 
So does the financialisation of the commodity markets help in risk-sharing? Xiong explains how 
financial traders tend to be momentum traders who buy when prices rise, and sell when prices 
fall, while hedgers/farmers are the exact opposite. But when price momentum starts to build, 
things can go awry as they did when commodity prices collapsed in 2008. 
“The open interest of commodity futures contracts also collapsed, shrinking by half in many 
markets,” recalls Xiong, referring to open positions in the futures market. “This reduction in 
traders’ positions is curious because a financial crisis shouldn’t affect the crops in the field. In 
that sense, the hedging needs of the farmers did not change because of what happened on Wall 
Street, but on the other hand, their hedging positions shrank by half.” 
He adds, “I think financial traders suffered largely because of their overall risk exposure to the 
financial markets, causing great distress to their overall portfolios. As a result, they might have 
been forced to reduce their positions in commodity futures, and as a result the hedgers on the 
short side had to accommodate the needs of financial traders to reduce their long positions.” 
Overall, the financialisation of commodity markets do help in risk-sharing, but it also increases 
the risk of a bubble forming. 
 
